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The Influence of U.S. Strategic Culture on Innovation and
Adaptation in the U.S. Army
Abstract
Culture is an abstract phenomenon that influences its environment. According to culture
theorist Edgar Schein, “culture is an abstraction, yet the forces that are created in social
and organizational situations that derive from culture are powerful. If we don’t understand
the operation of these forces, we become victim to them.” As a subset of culture, the
strategic culture of the United States requires study so we can understand its influences on
innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army, and try to manage those that adversely affect
the insititution’s ongoing transformation. Using the American Interwar era (1919-1941) as
a case—based on some similarities to the contemporary period—this article focuses on the
adverse influences of America’s strategic culture on innovation and adaptation in the U.S.
Army to provide insight to Army leaders addressing similar (recurring) cultural hindrances
to transformation. As the Army transforms amidst conflict and budget reductions, it is
important to examine and mitigate the negative influences of the broader strategic culture
on its ability to innovate and adapt.
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Introduction
Culture is an abstract phenomenon that influences its environment.
According to culture theorist Edgar Schein, “culture is an abstraction, yet the
forces that are created in social and organizational situations that derive from
culture are powerful. If we don’t understand the operation of these forces, we
become victim to them.”1 As a subset of culture, the strategic culture of the
United States requires study so we can understand its influences on
innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army, and try to manage those that
adversely affect the institution’s ongoing transformation. Using the American
Interwar era (1919-1941) as a case—based on some similarities to the
contemporary period—this article focuses on the adverse influences of
America’s strategic culture on innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army to
provide insight to Army leaders addressing similar (recurring) cultural
hindrances to transformation. The article does not intend to imply, by its
focus, that American strategic culture is incompatible with innovation and
adaptation in the U.S. Army—contrastingly this nation’s strategic culture has
fielded arguably the world’s most lethal land force—but it continues to exert
some adverse influences on Army innovation and adaptation that require
study and mitigation. This writing will highlight these adverse influences and
recommend a way to manage them.
The literature on strategic culture reveals various interpretations of what
comprises the strategic culture of a state. According to Peter Katzenstein
strategic culture is a socially constructed identity that shapes national security
policy and strategic behavior.2 Alastair Johnston explained strategic culture
as the interaction of a state’s higher level strategic assumptions shaped by
history; and lower level assumptions about the best strategic options for
operating in the rules-based international regime.3 Despite various
interpretations of what constitutes strategic culture, there is a common
refrain that as a whole it influences state behavior. This theoretical
dichotomy holds implications for innovation and adaptation in the U.S Army.
The interwar period is an excellent historical case for studying the influence of
strategic culture on Army innovation and adaptation because it is similar to
1 Schein, Edgar H, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd edition (San Francisco,
CA: Jossey Bass, 2004), 4.
2 Katzenstein, Peter J, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 4.
3 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 4:19
(1995): 46–48, available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119.
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the contemporary period in terms of defense budget and force reductions,
economic uncertainty, persistent conflict, and the proliferation of emerging
military technology. Some scholars have even compared the complexity of the
contemporary strategic environment to that of the interwar period. In 2014,
John Peters and his colleagues wrote that “the adversaries and the missions
that the Army must be prepared for are more ambiguous and diverse than at
any time since the period between the World Wars.”4 How American
strategic culture influenced Army innovation and adaptation at a similar
juncture in U.S. history can provide valuable insight into managing its effects
on Army innovation and adaptation today.
Military change or transformation is mainly attained through innovation and
adaptation. It occurs when technological innovation (new or existing technology)
converges with adaptations in the military’s organizational structure, concept of war,
and vision of future conflict. Theo Farrell similarly characterizes military change as
“change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization.”5
Though he views military change as a series of paradigmatic shifts through time—
revolutions in the conduct of select aspects of military affairs—Dima Adamsky also
similarly characterizes military change, describing it as “radical military innovation,
in which new organizational structures together with novel force deployment
methods, usually but not always driven by new technologies, change the conduct of
warfare.”6

Strategic Culture and Army Innovation and Adaptatation in the
Interwar Period
Examining a broad, abstract subject as strategic culture requires adoption of
units of analysis. Based on the earlier characterization of strategic culture as
a driver of state behavior, this article adopts the following units of analysis to
evaluate the influence of American strategic culture on U.S. Army innovation
and adaptation in the interwar era:

4 Peters, John et al., A Methodology For Developing Army Acquisition Strategies For An
Uncertain Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 2, available at:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG532.su
m.pdf.
5 Theo Farrell, “Innovation in Military Organizations Without Enemies,” International
Studies Association Annual Convention, April 16–20, 1996, in Theo Farrell and Terry
Terriff (eds.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture Politics and Technology (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 5.
6 Adamsky, Dima, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors
on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S. and Israel (Redwood, CA:
Stanford University Press 2010), 1.
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U.S. Congress and its role in defense legislation and oversight;
U.S. Presidency and the preference for force and diplomacy; and the
American Way of War

These units of analysis are adopted based on the theory that shared
institutions and traditions and a mutual way of seeing things are aspects of
culture. The cultural theorist Edgar Schein lists encompassing customs and
rituals, and common paradigms of thought and shared meanings among the
approaches to defining or describing culture.7 The latter applies to culture at
the strategic level. In other words, there are traditions, common paradigms of
thought and shared meanings in the institutions that authorize (legally
mandate), fund and employ America’s Army in support of its strategic goals.

The U.S. Congress and its Role in Defense Legislation and
Oversight
The United States Congress has constitutional control of the national purse.
The nation’s elected legislators can shape policies supportive or obstructive of
Army innovation and adaptation by affording or withholding the monetary
resources vital to research, development, experimentation, procurement and
doctrinal reorganization.
During the interwar period, Congress hindered conditions supportive of
innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army. Arguably influenced in part by
an anachronistic, 18th century tradition of post-war force and spending
reductions, Congress adopted a parsimonious approach to national security
that drastically reduced Army forces as well as War Department funding for
research and procurement post World War I. According to Allan R. Millett
and his co-authors, Congress believed the nation did not need a large active
duty post-war force, thus it denied the Army’s request for 500,000 active duty
troops, and opted for an active force of 280,000 in the 1920 National Defense
Act.8 Congress chose not to fund the 500,000-man Army proposed by then
Army Chief of Staff General Peyton March in the Baker-March bill. Congress
did not see the need for a large standing army after World War I, despite the
strategic commitments of the day, or the mobilization lessons of that conflict.
David Johnson concurs that interwar

7 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 12-13.
8 Millett, Allan R., Peter Maslowski and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A

Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 2012), 344.
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“Congressional attitudes reflected two fundamental American
traditions: distrust of large standing armies and an unswerving belief
in the preeminence of the citizen soldier. The U.S. National Army had
mobilized when it was needed and demobilized when the emergency
had passed—just as it always had.”9
The Congressionally mandated force and budget reductions of the interwar
period denied resources vital for research and experimentation with doctrine,
organization and technology—critical components of Army innovation and
adaptation. Millet and his colleagues wrote that congressionally mandated
spending cuts further “limited the Army to developing weapons prototypes: it
did not have enough money to reequip its field forces to contemporary
European standards.”10 Defense spending cuts during the early interwar
period denied critical funding for materiel development and procurement for
the Army. According to the Richard Stewart and the Center of Military
History, the 1920 National Defense Act (signed by President Warren G.
Harding) gave the War Department around roughly “$300 million per year.
This was about half the estimated cost of fully implementing the force
structure authorized in the National Defense Act.”11 Additionally, Millet and
his co-authors wrote that
“…from 1925 until 1940 the War Department spent about $6.2 billion.
Of this sum, $854 million (roughly two years’ appropriations) went to
weapons procurement and research and development; the ground
forces received only $344 million of these appropriations, or an annual
average of $21 million for new procurement.”12
Richard Stewart and the Center of Military History help to illustrate the
consequence of the decreasing Army budget; they wrote that for much of the
interwar period (until the mid to late 1930s), “Army arsenals and laboratories
were consequently handicapped by small budgets. Little new equipment was
forthcoming for ground units until Army appropriations began to rise in
1936.”13
9 Johnson, David E., Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–
1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 55.
10 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 358.
11 Stewart, Richard W. and U.S. Army Center for Military History, American Military
History, Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2008 (Washington,
D.C.: Center of Military History, 2010), 61.
12 Millet, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 358.
13 Stewart and Center of Military History, American Military History, 61.
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Congress did foster some innovation and adaptation in the Army to mitigate
the force reduction and the lack of modern equipment to replace obsolete
World War I gear. Amidst the defense budget cuts of the era, Congress passed
the Air Corps Act in 1926, which improved the Army’s air capability. This
legislation also set the Air Corps as a separate branch within the Army, and
authorized a 1,800 airplane modernization plan.14

The U.S. Presidency and the Preference for Force and
Diplomacy
A President’s operational code refers to his or her preference for the
employment of the military and diplomacy. This shapes the level of resources
he or she is willing to invest in the Army and the other services—something
that is vital to innovation and adaptation. Steven Hook argues that a
president’s preference for force or diplomacy is based on his “operational
code”—a confluence of “principled beliefs regarding the virtues and
limitations of human nature, the proper roles of government
and…national…and global problems,” as well as “causal beliefs about the best
means available for solving these problems.”15 In other words, Presidents
assume office with their own distinct personalities, preferences and world
views, which shape their perceptions and their decisions about considerations
of policy inputs regarding the use of force and diplomacy in international
affairs.
A brief look at defense policy during the interwar era Presidencies of
Woodrow Wilson from 1913 to 1921, Calvin Coolidge from 1923 to 1929,
Herbert Hoover from 1929 to 1933, and Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1933 to
1945 highlights how Presidential preference for the use of force and
diplomacy influenced two key prerequisites for Army innovation and
adaptation—funding and manning.
President Woodrow Wilson was averse to the use of force even when it was
supported by public opinion and instrumental to furthering his views on
international norms and influencing the strategic behavior of foreign
governments. He strongly preferred diplomacy to force as the means of
realizing U.S. foreign policy objectives. According to Arthur Walworth,
during the crisis with Mexico involving the military junta of General Huerta
14 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 349.
15 Hook, Steven W., U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power, 4th edition (Los
Angeles, CA: Sage, 2014), 93.
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“Wilson reluctantly reached the conclusion that force must be used to
dislodge Huerta, but he hoped that it would not have to be the force of the
United States.” 16 To this end, Walworth wrote, Wilson lifted an existing U.S.
arms embargo on Mexico that permitted the flow of arms to Venustiano
Carranza, who was fighting against Huerta.17 Writing on Woodrow Wilson’s
outlook on war and diplomacy, Walworth stated that the President
“…gave consideration to both disarmament and arbitration as means
to peace. Though he said little or nothing in public about
disarmament, he talked with Sir William Tyrrell of the necessity of
curbing armaments.”18
It follows, given Wilson’s preference for diplomacy, that the Army was small,
and unprepared in terms of equipment at the start of World War I. Dwight D.
Eisenhower wrote that the interwar Army under Wilson’s administration was
modest in size; “its total strength in the spring of 1915 was approximately
120,000.”19 Writing about war mobilization on America’s entry into World
War I in 1917, Eisenhower stated “as usual, our country was sadly—close to
totally—unprepared. While we had mobilized a few more regular regiments
in 1916, the strength of the Regular Army was awfully small. Intensive efforts
had to start at once to bring our strength up.”20 Walworth adds that “there
was no Army to send. German military experts ranked the force of the United
States on a level with those of tiny nations.”21
President Calvin Coolidge’s (1923-1929) operational code indicated a strong
preference for diplomacy over force thus he continued Army downsizing with
limited (treaty enforced) naval armament. According to David Johnson,
“Coolidge’s avowed domestic program was to reduce government
expenditures and enable a tax reduction, and his foreign policy focused on
international disarmament. War Department pleas for a larger Army were
contrary to both programs.”22 Coolidge continued the reduction of Army
ground forces pursued by the Harding administration, but grew the U.S. Navy
16 Walworth, Arthur, Woodrow Wilson, 2nd edition (Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965), 369.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 378.
19 Eisenhower, Dwight D., At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (New York: Doubleday &
Company Inc, 1967), 33.
20 Ibid., 127.
21 Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, 101.
22 Johnson, Fast Tanks, 68.
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to meet the nation’s strategic maritime interests. He also expanded American
airpower. President Coolidge was averse to maintaining the peacetime
ground forces deemed necessary by the Army’s leadership to meet the
nation’s strategic obligations and war readiness. Thus, budget cuts during
Coolidge’s administration would reduce the army to about 130,000.23
Johnson adds that in a speech delivered in 1925, President Coolidge
expressed doubts as to whether the post-World War I strategic environment
warranted the budget requirements of the War Department, and stated that
“the turning of such resources into the making of good roads, the building of
better homes, the promotion of education and all the others [sic] arts of peace
which ministry to the advancement of human welfare.”24
The Coolidge administration did make some investments in the Army with
regard to emerging airplane technology. According to Millett and his coauthors, in 1926 Coolidge signed the Air Corps Act into law, “which…
provided for a force of 1,514 officers, 16,000 men and 1,800 planes, which
would be modernized by a five-year expansion and modernization
program.”25
President Herbert Hoover (1929 to 1933) seemed to prefer diplomacy to force
as a way to preserve U.S. strategic interests. Consistent with this outlook,
Herbert Hoover cut back on the naval shipbuilding plans of the Coolidge
administration, and maintained the peacetime trend of reduced Army
budgets. According to Millett and his co-authors, in addition to agreeing to
further limits to naval shipbuilding at the 1930 London Conference with
Britain and Japan, the Hoover administration opposed the 1929 shipbuilding
program. Millett and his co-authors added that under Hoover,
“…the United States agreed to cut its heavy-cruiser program to
eighteen ships within an 180,000-ton ceiling…and funding for
manning the fleet, operations, maintenance, and modernization
dropped about 20 percent below the funds actually authorized in
1922.”26
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration (1933 to 1945) sought to
reverse the disarmament and military resource deprivation of the Hoover
23 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 355.
24 Johnson, Fast Tanks, 68.
25 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 349.
26 Ibid., 351.
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administration. This was consistent with events in the global strategic
environment (including the ascendance to power of Adolf Hitler in 1933 and
German rearmament). Millett and his co-authors note that “after more than a
decade of limiting its armed forces through international agreement and
unilateral fiscal action, the United States in 1933 began to rearm.” An early
example was Roosevelt’s 1933 public works allocation of $238 million for
building “two carriers, four cruisers and twenty destroyers” over three
years.27 Johnson observes that Roosevelt also wanted to greatly expand
American airpower, and that he pursued a 6,000 airplane development plan
by 1939 on the recommendation of the War Department.28
The interwar era Presidents discussed above generally seemed to prefer
diplomacy to the military instrument of U.S. national power. Thus, with the
exception of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was compelled to rearm by
growing conventional threats in Europe and Asia, the executives during this
period reduced Army ground forces and funding.

The American Way of War
How America perceives, prepares, fights and ends wars is part of its strategic
culture and can be called the American Way of War. According to Meilinger,
the American approach to war is characterized by a peacetime preference for
small, standing armies that can be rapidly mobilized, enlarged with reserve
and National Guard forces, fight quick and decisive battles, and demobilize at
war’s end.29 This approach impacts and shapes factors critical to Army
innovation and adaptation—funding, manning, organization, doctrine, and
experimentation. Phillip Meilinger wrote that America’s “approach to war
has developed in its own distinctive way.”30
In a sense, the American Way of War is a cultural approach that justifies
drastic post-war force and funding reductions for the U.S. Army, which
hinders innovation and adaptation. America’s primarily Anglo-Saxon
heritage causes most Americans to adopt a linear, inductive mode of
reasoning that underpins the national cognitive approach towards war and
military readiness. According to John Mole,

27 Millet, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 363–364.
28 Johnson, Fast Tanks, 65.
29 Phillip S. Meilinger, “American Military Culture and Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly
46 (2007): 80.
30 Meilinger, “American Military Culture and Strategy,” 80.
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“…since the renaissance Europe has been divided between the
pragmatic, empirical, inductive thinking of Anglo-Saxon and North
Sea cultures and the rationalist, deductive thinking of the rest of the
continent. Anglo Saxons are uncomfortable with theories and
generalizations and concepts. They prefer to deal with data.”31
This means that for the most part Americans think inductively—they develop
general laws from facts and empirical data, going linearly from cause to effect.
This helps explain the practice of reducing forces and funding vital to Army
innovation and adaptation in periods between wars despite persistent global
conflict and threats to the United States.
Writing on the influence of society on the military during the course of U.S.
history, Millett and his co-authors assert that Americans’ “fear of large
standing forces” has been one of the factors that have “at various times
imposed severe limitations on the availability of monetary and manpower
resources.”32 Article I of the U.S. Constitution encourages this ad hoc and
socially reinforced congressional approach to Army readiness by stipulating
that “Congress shall have the power…to raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years.”33 The implication here is that Congress is expected to constantly
reevaluate the need for an Army and expand and reduce it accordingly. In
other words, the U.S. Constitution reinforces and perpetuates the national
perception that the Army is to be drastically retrograded between wars, and
frantically upgraded to fight and win them—a great concept for an 18th
century developing nation, but a serious problem for a superpower in an era
of persistent conflict.
The American Way of War induced and rationalized defense sequestration
that seriously hindered Army innovation and adaptation in the interwar era.
According to Millett and his co-authors
“…from 1925 to 1940 the War Department spent about … $854 million
on weapons procurement and research and development; the ground

31 John Mole, “The Geography of Thinking,” Clinical Medicine 2 4(2002): 343.
32 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, xiv.
33 The Charters of Freedom, Constitution of the United States, available at:
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html.
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forces received only $344 million of these appropriations, or an annual
average of $21 million for new procurement.”34
This amount of funding—though helpful for research and development of new
equipment like the M1 Garand rifle, the 105 mm howitzer, and the 60 and 81
mm mortars—was insufficient for refitting the interwar Army to keep pace
with European armies.35 As previously mentioned Congress chose not to fund
the 500,000-man Army proposed by Army Chief of Staff General Peyton
March in the Baker-March bill. Consistent with the long-established
American Way of War, Congress did not see the need for a large standing
army after World War I, regardless of the strategic commitments of the day or
mobilization lessons of that conflict.

Some Insights for Today’s Army Leaders
Analysis of the influence of strategic culture on Army innovation and
adaptation in the interwar period provides useful insight for today’s Army
leaders facing recurring strategic cultural challenges to transformation.
Congressionally-mandated force and spending reductions beset today’s Army
much like they did in the interwar period. Congressional parsimony to the
Army during the interwar period could be partially explained by a lack of
persuasiveness of strategic net assessments, which were made by the War
Department’s Joint Army-Navy Board. The latter was also responsible for
developing war plans. A close link should exist between strategic net
assessments of potential adversarial state and non-state entities, and military
capability development. Allan Millett concurs that “the history of the
interwar period does demonstrate a relationship between strategic net
assessment and changes in military capability.”36
Net assessments can partially explain the level of resources (supportive of
innovation and adaptation) made available or withheld from the Army during
the interwar period. Thus, the relatively low level of resource investment in
Army ground forces during the interwar period can be attributed to what
David Kahn assessed as a general lack of consideration of the developing
defense capabilities of potential adversaries. Kahn wrote that

34 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 358.
35 Ibid.
36 Allan R. Millett, “Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period,” in
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar
Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 336.
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“in designing and procuring military forces…matters as whether
Germany had 100 divisions or 300 and whether Japan had 10 carriers
or 20 were not even raised when policy-makers examined the basic
issues of strategy.”37
Consequently, Congressionally-mandated force and budget reductions
reduced the force capabilities required to defend U.S. interests in the Pacific
based on War Plan Orange. According to Calvin Christman, War Plan Orange
was the Joint Army-Navy Board’s plan for fighting Japan and it called for the
Army’s defense against an initial Japanese attack on the Philippines while the
Navy fought and destroyed the Japanese Navy enroute to relieve the Army.38
Christman wrote that for a successful naval maneuver to the Philippines, War
Plan Orange required “advanced bases in the mandated islands…to be seized,
and neither the army nor the Marines had the necessary troops to seize
them.”39
It is disconcerting that not only did the Army lack the troop levels needed to
execute War Plan Orange, it also lacked the amphibious capability essential to
maneuver in the Asia-Pacific, which arguably boasts the Earth’s largest
concentration of non-contiguous land mass (lots of islands). Leo Daugherty
wrote that the Army would not designate amphibious forces until 1939 when
it tasked the 3rd Infantry Division to conduct training for amphibious
operations. Daugherty cited “the lack of money and public support for the
military” as factors responsible for the lack of training and readiness.40
Today’s Army finds itself in a similar predicament vis-a-vis the strategic pivot
to the Asia-Pacific.
Strategic Net Assessments showing the Army’s sequestration-induced
unpreparedness to execute War Plan Orange failed to convince U.S. policy
makers to invest the resources needed to bring Army ground forces to the
level adequate to attain national strategic goals in the Pacific. The Army’s
ability to defend U.S. interests in the Philippines and Hawaii against an
37 David Kahn, “The United States views Germany and Japan in 1941,” in Ernest R. May
(ed.) Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 478.
38 Calvin Christman, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Craft of Strategic Assessment,” in
Williamson Murray and Allan Reed Millett (eds.) Calculations: Net Assessment and the
Coming of World War II, (New York: Free Press, 1992),” 238–239.
39 Christman, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Craft of Strategic Assessment,” 240.
40 Daugherty III, Leo J., Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare 1898–1945: Profiles of
Fourteen American Military Strategists (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland and Company,
2009), 336.
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increasingly belligerent Japan under War Plan Orange was degraded by
sustained defense sequestration during the interwar period. Brian Linn wrote
that after the 1920 Defense Act “the Regular forces in the Pacific never
approached the peacetime strength envisioned by General Peyton March. In
1921 the Philippines had a garrison of 13,251 and Hawaii one of 15,368; three
years later their forces totaled 11,808 and 13,096 respectively.”41
The American Way of War is an anachronistic 18th century approach to war
that is harmful to Army innovation and adaptation in the current era of
persistent conflict. This cognitive approach causes most Americans today—
like their 18th century countrymen—to object to having a large standing
professional military, and reinforces the assumption that the nation can raise
a lethal army of fresh young recruits and conscripts on relatively short notice.
America’s global dominance (in contrast to its 18th century struggle for
international survival), coupled with the highly technical and complex nature
of military operations in the 21st century, requires a professional, active army
adequately funded and sized to attain its strategic goals. Hastily trained
masses of recruits and possibly conscripts post authorization of force, or
declaration of war could prove a very poor substitute for a larger force of
trained professionals, immersed in the highly technical and equally complex
human dimensions of 21st century warfare. The tradition of raising an Army
when needed while practical to the United States in its infancy, and apt for
18th century geopolitics, undermines and hinders attainment of the highly
matured, complex strategic objectives of the world’s only superpower.
Army leaders today actively sensitize the American people, their
representatives in Congress, and the President to the sequestration induced
disparity between Army forces, funding and the strategic objectives of the
nation. From observation, one could argue that they are doing better than
their interwar era counterparts who similarly fought to preserve force and
funding levels adequate to innovate, adapt and defend U.S. interests abroad.
General Raymond Odierno, the former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, stated that:
“Today we have Soldiers deployed on every continent except
Antarctica. We have Soldiers doing important missions in the
security environment around the world. Frankly it is probably
increasing in instability, which is requiring Army Forces to
deploy to different places simultaneously. We are doing this
41 Linn, Brian McAllister, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–
1940 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 146.
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while we continue to downsize the Army and take risks in
modernization and readiness, and frankly I am starting to
worry about our end strength.”42
Sensitization appears to be the most pragmatic and effective alternative
available to the Army’s leaders to reduce the adverse effects of America’s
strategic culture on Army innovation and adaptation. Relentless sensitization
will do well to continuously highlight the harmful effects of an anachronistic
national strategic culture that seems to view the military requirements of a
highly evolved superpower, through 18th century lens tinted with that era’s
national and geopolitical concerns.

Conclusion
America’s strategic culture shapes the ebb and flow of the resources necessary
for innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army. Defense spending and
legislation, the national cognitive approach to war, and the operational code
of American Presidents traditionally combine to promote resources for
innovation and adaptation at the onset and duration of a conflict, and then
drastically reduce such resources post-war. This is problematic in the
contemporary period of persistent conflict. Army leaders today should
continue, and where possible redouble their efforts to mitigate this ebb and
flow effect of U.S. strategic culture on Army innovation and adaptation.
Future research could focus on how culture at the organizational level (within
the U.S. Army) influenced innovation and adaptation during the interwar
period. Such a study could provide insight and help curb recurring interwar
era Army practices that hinder the Army’s current transformation efforts.
Moreover, this research could contribute to historical dialogue on the role of
Army organizational challenges to modernization vis-a-vis the defense
policies of the White House, and Congressional oversight.

42 Raymond Odierno, “SecArmy, CSA statement/answers at AUSA Annual Meeting
Opening Press Conference,” U.S. Army, October 13, 2014, available at:
http://www.army.mil/article/136086/.
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